NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 10 | Issue 1

Article 19

2006

Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege Goodbye:
The Erosion of the Privilege by Federal Financial
Regulatory Agencies
Priscilla L. Walton

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Priscilla L. Walton, Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege Goodbye: The Erosion of the Privilege by Federal Financial Regulatory Agencies, 10
N.C. Banking Inst. 397 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol10/iss1/19

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.

Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege Goodbye: The Erosion of
the Privilege by Federal Financial Regulatory Agencies
I. INTRODUCTION
As in-house counsel for a regional bank, a member of
management comes to you with the suspicion that the bank is engaged
in an unsound practice. The manager is concerned that corrective action
is necessary, though the practice has gone unnoticed up to this point.
You recommend that the bank conduct an internal investigation and,
following the investigation, conclude that the manager's suspicion was
correct. However, before corrective action can be taken, a federal
financial regulator comes knocking on your door. The regulator also
suspects that the bank is engaged in an unsound practice and seeks full
cooperation from you during its investigation. The regulator asks
whether any employees have discussed the situation with you and
mentions that the regulator will "look favorably" on full and complete
cooperation with the investigation.
If this were a discovery request in traditional civil or criminal
litigation, your answer would be simple - the attorney-client privilege
protects communications between attorney and client and you do not
have to disclose to the regulator any discussions that you had with the
However, in the context of a federal regulatory
employee.'
2
While
investigation, invoking the privilege is more complicated.
attempting to protect the confidences and privacy of the attorney-client
communication, invoking the privilege with respect to a financial
regulatory investigation could potentially lead to more intense
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); see infra notes 14-18 and
accompanying text.
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege
available at
18, 2005),
12-13 (May
and Report, at
Recommendation
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/ [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report]. The Report
states that "[t]here is general agreement that if a company discloses attorney-client
privileged material to a regulator or prosecutor, the company thereby waives the attorneyclient privilege as far as the particular information is concerned. The cases disagree whether
the effect is also to impliedly waive that privilege with respect to all other attorney-client
communications on the same subject matter." Id. The American Bar Association will
hereinafter be referred to as the "ABA."
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investigation into your client's affairs and harsher penalties if violations
are discovered.' On the other hand, choosing to waive the privilege for
the purposes of the regulatory investigation may mean that the privilege
is waived for any subsequent litigation by shareholders or other third
parties stemming from the investigation.4
The dilemma presented in the above hypothetical has occurred
with increasing frequency in the post-Enron era of aggressive regulatory
investigation.'
In order to minimize the public attention on
investigations and to receive favorable treatment from regulatory
agencies, corporations often waive their attorney-client privilege in an
attempt to cooperate fully with the regulators. 6 This note will discuss
how waiver of the privilege by financial institutions in connection with
federal financial regulatory investigations by the bank regulators' has
led to the erosion of the attorney-client privilege, and the implications
of such erosion on the banking industry and on counsel for banking
institutions.
Part II of this Note will discuss the application of the attorneyclient privilege in the corporate context. Part III will examine the
erosion of the privilege by waiver in government investigations,
specifically focusing on recent examples in the context of Securities and
Exchange Commission 9 and Department of Justice10 investigations."
3. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to United

States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Thompson Memo]. The
Thompson Memo revised the principles that Department of Justice prosecutors should use in
deciding whether to seek charges against a business. Among the factors identified, the
Thompson Memo states that prosecutors may consider "the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation [including] a waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections ...
Id.
4. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993).
5. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 13-14.
6. George J. Terwilliger III, Responding to Investigations, 27 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15,
2005, at 13. "[E]nforcement authorities examine in every case both affirmative steps taken
immediately to cooperate and, conversely, any efforts to obstruct their investigations.
Failure to cooperate can harden prosecutors' attitudes significantly and render a bad
situation even worse." Id.
7. The regulators of banking institutions, the Office of Thrift Supervision [hereinafter
OTS], the Office of the Comptroller of Currency [hereinafter OCC], the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation [hereinafter FDIC], and the Federal Reserve Board [hereinafter
FRB], will hereinafter be referred to as the "bank regulators."
8. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
9. Hereinafter SEC.
10. Hereinafter DOJ.
11. See infra notes 25-97 and accompanying text.
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Part IV will discuss the privilege in the context of bank regulators,
including the enforcement powers of bank regulators and whether
cooperation with bank regulators constitutes waiver for third party
actions. 2 Part V will discuss the implications of the erosion of the
3
privilege and proposed legislative solutions to the waiver issue.
II. THE APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO A
CORPORATE CLIENT

The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence that protects
4 The
communications between attorney and client from discovery.'
privilege is based on the notion that it is in the best interest of the
administration of justice for clients to make full disclosure to the
attorneys who represent them.' 5 The attorney-client privilege only
applies to communications between attorney and client.' 6 The purpose
of the privilege is to "encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients"'" and should apply "only where necessary to
achieve [this] purpose.'
Applying the privilege in the context of the corporate client is
complicated because of the difficulty in determining who within the
corporation falls within the definition of "client."' 9 The seminal case
regarding the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context is
Upjohn v. United States.20 There, the Supreme Court expressly rejected
the notion that the privilege only applies to persons in the corporation's
control group.2' Although the control group test was rejected in
12. See infra notes 98-124 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 125-164 and accompanying text.
14. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 3. The attorney-client privilege is a rule
of evidence, but "[w]hen the law of a state provides the rule of decision for an element of a
claim or defense in accordance with the Erie doctrine, federal courts must apply the
applicable state's law of privileges to evidence offered to prove or disprove that element of
the claim or defense." JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.02 (2005).
15. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888).
16. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
17. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950).
18. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986).
19. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 5.
20. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
21. Id. at 397 (concluding that "the narrow 'control group test' .. . cannot, consistent
with the principles of the common law as interpreted in the light of reason and experience,
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Upjohn,22 courts have not consistently decided who in a corporation
falls within the meaning of "client."2 3 To further complicate matters,
despite the Supreme Court's holding in Upjohn, some state courts still
apply the control group test to determine who the attorney-client
privilege applies to within the corporation.24

III.

EROSION OF THE PRIVILEGE BY WAIVER IN GOVERNMENT
INVESTIGATIONS

The effects of the erosion of the attorney-client privilege have
been widely discussed in terms of SEC investigations and the DOJ
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.25
In these areas, pressure by
government agencies for full cooperation in investigations has led to an
increased disclosure of potentially privileged information, which, in
turn, has led to courts deeming the privilege waived with regard to third
govern the development of the law in this area") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The "control group test" is based on the premise that, in order for the privilege to apply, the
corporation, not an individual employee must be seeking advice from the attorney. Thus, an
employee who is in a position to "control or... take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney,... then, in
effect, he is (or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and
the privilege would apply." Id. at 390, quoting General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312
F.2d 742 (CA3 1962).
22. Id. at 391.
23. After Upjohn, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that "[i]f the
communication is made by a person not within the 'control group' of the corporation, then it
is only privileged if: (1) the communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate
superior; (3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice;
(4) the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate
duties; (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the
corporate structure, need to know its contents." Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 672 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1986) (citing Diversified Industries v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)). However,. two years later, the Ninth Circuit
held that the attorney-client privilege applies "to communications by any corporate
employee regardlessof position when the communications concern matters within the scope
of the employee's corporate duties and the employee is aware that the information is being
furnished to enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation." Admiral Ins. Co.
v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). For a
complete discussion of the Circuit Court split on the application of the privilege, see
Sherman L. Cohn, The OrganizationalClient: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-Contact
Rule, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 755-760 (1997).
24. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 7. For example, the Illinois Supreme
Court expressly rejected Upjohn and applied the control-group test. Consolidation Coal v.
Bucyrus-Eerie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982).
25. See infra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
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party investigations.2 6 It is important to look at the effects of privilege
waiver with respect to the SEC and DOJ in order to determine the
possible effects the erosion of the privilege will have on financial
institutions.
A. SEC's SeaboardReport
The attorney-client privilege has been largely eroded in the
context of SEC investigations. In 2001, the SEC declined to take action
2
against the Seaboard Corporation, because of the company's efforts to
2
cooperate with an SEC investigation. An employee of a subsidiary of
Seaboard, Chestnut Hill Farms, had "caused the company's books and
29
to be misstated.
records to be inaccurate and its financial reports
Within weeks of learning about the employee's misconduct, Seaboard
fired the employee and disclosed the misstated financial statements to
the SEC.30 The SEC launched an investigation, in which:
[Seaboard] pledged and gave complete cooperation to
[the SEC]. It provided the [SEC] with all information
relevant to the underlying violations. Among other
things, the company produced the details of its internal
investigation, including notes and transcripts of
interviews of [employees]; and it did not invoke the
attorney-client privilege, work product protection or
other privileges or protections with respect to any facts
uncovered in the investigation."
One of the criteria the SEC considered in deciding not to take
action against Seaboard was that the "the company voluntarily disclosed
information [the SEC] did not directly request and otherwise might not

26. Id.
27. Hereinafter Seaboard.

28. Securities and Exchange Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation
to Agency Enforcement Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001)
[hereinafter Seaboard Report].
29. Id.

30. Id.
31.

Id. (emphasis added).
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have uncovered" 32 and that "the company ask[ed] its employees to
cooperate with [the SEC] and ma[de] all reasonable efforts to secure
such cooperation."33 Coupled with public remarks made by SEC
officials, 3 4 the Seaboard Report has been viewed in the legal community
as a statement from the SEC that it now "regards the production of
attorney-client privileged information.., as a necessary element of
cooperation." 35
B. The DOJ Thompson Memo and FederalSentencing Guidelines
In the wake of the high-profile corporate scandals of the early
2000s, government regulatory agencies have become increasingly
vigilant in conducting investigations into potential corporate
misconduct.3 6
The result has been an increase in the level of
cooperation with investigations in order to keep the regulators at bay.37
In 2003, the Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson 31 published a
memo that outlined nine factors for federal prosecutors to consider in
making decisions with respect to prosecuting businesses (the
"Thompson Memo").3 9 One consideration is "the corporation's timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate
in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of
corporate attorney-client and work-product protection. 4 ° While the
Thompson Memo states that the DOJ does not require waiver of the
32. Id. at 3.

33. Seaboard Report, supra note 28, at 3. In a footnote to the Seaboard Report,
however, the SEC states that "[i]n some cases, the desire to provide information to the
Commission staff may cause companies to consider choosing not to assert the attorneyclient privilege, the work product protection and other privileges, protections and
exemptions with respect to the Commission. The Commission recognizes that these
privileges, protections and exemptions serve important social interests. In this regard, the
Commission does not view a company's waiver of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as
a means (where necessary) to provide relevant and sometimes critical information to the
Commission staff." Id. at 5.
34. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, The Themes of Sarbanes-Oxley
as reflected in the Commission's Enforcement Program, Remarks at UCLA School of Law
(Sept. 20, 2004), http://www.sec.goc/news/speech/spch092004smc.htm.
35. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 17.
36. Id. at 14.
37. See Terwilliger, supra note 6.
38. Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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privilege, it also stresses that waivers may be necessary to enable the
of the corporation's voluntary
agency "to evaluate the completeness
'

disclosure and cooperation."'
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines for corporations that
became effective in 2004 give sentencing "points" if an organization
fully cooperates in an investigation. 42 For example, the Sentencing
Guidelines Manual States that "[i]f the organization fully cooperated in
the investigation ... subtract 2 points [from the organization's
culpability score]. 43 The Thompson Memo's reference to waiver of the

privilege, combined with the Federal Sentencing Guideline's rewards
for privilege waiver, are important because of the pressure this seems to
44
place on corporate counsel to comply with all requests.

C. Does Cooperationwith Regulators Constitute a Waiverfor Third
PartyActions?
In light of the SEC's Seaboard Report and the Thompson

Memo, it appears that cooperation with investigation, including
4a
Thus corporate
privilege waiver, is necessary to a favorable outcome.
with
associated
counsel must weigh favorable treatment with the risks

waiver.46 Because waiver in a regulatory investigation may result in
waiver for third party actions, careful consideration must be given as to
the best course of action.47 However, questions remain as to whether

cooperation with investigation is actually a "voluntary" action that
would constitute a privilege waiver4 8 and whether the regulatory agency
41. Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the
Impact of Privilege Waivers, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 591-92 (2004).
42. Notice of Submission to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, 69
Fed. Reg. 28994 (May 19, 2004). These new federal sentencing guidelines state that "in
some circumstances waiver of the attorney-client privilege ... may be required in order to
satisfy the requirements of cooperation." Id.
43. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(g)(2) (2004). The "culpability score"
is a measure used by the DOJ to determine the range of the fine imposed on the
organization. Id.
44. Joan McPhee & Peter Welsh, The Department of Justice's Guidelines for the
Prosecution of Business Organizations and Related Issues, Boston Bar Ass'n Seminar on
White Collar Crime, at 9, June 5, 2003.
45. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 14-44 and accompanying text
47. See supra notes 14-44 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
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conducting the investigation is really an "adversary" to the financial
institution for purposes of waiving the privilege. 49 As discussed below,
some jurisdictions have used the concept of "selective waiver" to
simplify the process of turning over potentially privileged information
to regulatory agencies.5 °
1. Is the Cooperation Sufficiently "Voluntary" to Constitute a Waiver?
"Voluntary" disclosure of privileged information will amount to
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. In general, the attorney-client
privilege is deemed waived when information is voluntarily disclosed to
a third party or a party makes the privileged communications an issue in
litigation. 2 Because regulatory agencies are third parties, disclosure of
privileged information to regulatory agencies is often deemed a waiver
of the privilege." Most courts have taken the view that disclosures to
regulators with enforcement authority are voluntary, to the extent that
the company voluntarily chose the type of business that subjects it to
such regulatory review.14 Corporations generally have to make a
judgment call in deciding whether to comply with the government's
request for waiver: cooperate and risk disclosure of privileged
information or withhold and face potential backlash."
Corporations
49. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
51. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235 (holding that "[t]he waiver doctrine provides
that voluntary disclosure.., waives the privilege as to other parties").
52. See David Francescani & Michael Auturo, Caught Between a Rock and a Hard
Place; Companies Continue to Wrestle with Dilemma that Disclosing Privileged
Information to Regulators and Auditors May Result in Waiver, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 2005, at
10.
53. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that when a corporation gives privileged information to a
regulator, the corporation waives the attorney-client privilege, even when made pursuant to
a confidentiality agreement). But see Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 561
(holding that Diversified made only a limited waiver of information when making a
disclosure pursuant to an SEC investigation).
54. See Reed Smith, Disclosure of Privileged Communications and Work Product to
Regulators, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, July 2, 2004. For example, in United States v. MIT,
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that MIT's disclosure of materials to the
Department of Defense amounted to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege because the
disclosure "resulted from its own voluntary choice, even if that choice was made at the time
it became a defense contractor and subjected itself to the alleged obligation of disclosure."
United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 687 (ist Cir. 1997).
55. McPhee & Welsh, supra note 44, at 9.
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that choose voluntary disclosure do so because they believe that there is
some benefit to be gained from disclosure.56 This "benefit" may be in

the form of offers of leniency, confidentiality agreements to protect
against disclosure to third parties, or complete dismissal of the
investigation if the questionable practice has been subsequently
corrected.57 Likewise, entities that choose not to voluntarily disclose
privileged information have implicitly decided that the risks of
disclosure outweigh the possible benefit of disclosing potentially
harmful communications between attorney and client.58
In April 2005, the Association of Corporate Counsel issued the
results of an online survey titled "Is the Attorney-ClientPrivilege Under
Attack? '59 More than thirty percent of in-house counsel respondents
indicated that their clients had "personally experienced an erosion in the
protections offered by the privilege" in the previous four years. 60 The
respondents stated that "[d]ecisions to claim or waive privilege were a
standard factor used by the government in deciding whether to charge,
whom to charge, and the seriousness of the charges." '6' Because of the
high pressure placed on counsel to comply with investigations, the
practice seems more like coercion than a feasible, voluntary option.62
2. Is the Government an "Adversary" For Purposes of Waiving the
Privilege?
Once a party allows an adversary to share the otherwise
privileged thought processes of counsel, the need for the privilege
seemingly disappears. 63 As a general rule, when a court finds that a
disclosure of information was voluntarily made to an adversary, it will
be more likely to find that the privilege was waived than if they were
56. In re Steinhardt Partners at 235-36 (quoting James B. Cox, Insider Trading
Regulationand the Productionof Evidence, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 421 (1986)).
57. See Lee G. Dunst & Ariane J. Sims, Outside Counsel; Cooperation With
Government Probes,Subsequent Litigation, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 2005, at 4.
58. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236.
59. Association of Corporate Counsel, Executive Summary: Association of Corporate
Counsel Survey: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, Apr. 6, 2005 [hereinafter
ACC Survey].
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Francescani & Auturo, supra note 52.
63. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235.
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otherwise compelled to turn over the information.64 This naturally leads
to the question of whether the government agency requesting the
investigation is considered an adversary for purposes of waiving the
privilege. Courts have refused to state categorically that a government
agency investigation automatically puts the agency and the corporation
in an adversarial position, 65 apparently because there may be situations
in which the corporation under investigation and the regulatory agency
have a common interest in analyzing the information.66
To determine whether a regulator is considered an adversary,
courts will look at the degree of commonality of interests between the
institution being investigated and the regulatory body. 67 Even in the
early stages of a regulatory investigation, "courts have held that
disclosures of information to regulatory" agencies that do not have
common litigation objectives with the corporation constitute a waiver of
69 the Second
the privilege.68 In Steinhardt Partners,
Circuit concluded
that the SEC was in an adversarial position to Steinhardt when
requesting a waiver of privileges during its investigation.7 ° Steinhardt
voluntarily submitted a memorandum containing legal theories to the
SEC while being investigated for possible violations regarding treasury
markets.7 Salomon Brothers subsequently sued Steinhardt, alleging
fraud and manipulation in Treasury markets, and requested production
of the documents previously turned over to the SEC in the government
investigation.
The district court ordered Steinhardt to produce the
documents to Salomon Brothers and Steinhardt petitioned for a writ of
mandamus to set aside the district court's order, arguing that the
documents were protected by the work product doctrine.73 The court
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. at 396. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court expressly
stated that "[c]rafting rules relating to privilege in matters of government investigations
must be done on a case by case basis." Id.
66. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236. For example, in In re Sealed Case, the
Second Circuit stated that the work product protection is only waived if the privileged
material is disclosed to a party who doesn't share common interests. 676 F.2d 793, 817
(D.D.C. 1982).
67. Francescani and Auturo, supra note 52, at 10.
68. See, e.g., United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d at 687.
69. 9 F.3d 230 (1993).
70. Id. at 236.
71. Id. at 235.
72. Id. at 232.
73. Id. at 232-33.
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held that the SEC was an adversary to Steinhardt in the investigation,
and that the privilege was therefore waived as to the subsequent
litigation, but "decline[d] to adopt a per se rule that all voluntary
74
disclosures to the government waive work product protection.
This portion of the Steinhardtdecision suggests that information
provided while complying with routine regulatory functions may not
place the institution in the requisite "adversarial" position with the
regulator to constitute a waiver of the privilege. The court stated that
"the determinative fact in analyzing the adversarial nature of the
relationship is the fact that Steinhardt knew that it was the subject of an
SEC investigation, and that the memorandum was sought as part of this
investigation. 75
In In re Bank One Securities Litigation,7 6 the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois considered whether the work
product doctrine 77 was waived by Bank One when Bank One produced
documents in response to an OCC examination. 78 Although Bank One
was not yet a party to litigation, the court held that the relationship
between Bank One and the OCC was adversarial in nature because
"[t]he OCC targeted Bank One for an investigation due to questionable
practices adopted by Bank One., 79 Considering Bank One80 and
1
together, it appears that, regardless of whether
Steinhardt Partners"
disclosure occurs during formal enforcement proceedings or an
agency's routine examinations, privileged materials will constitute a
waiver of the privilege and preclude the bank from claiming the
materials are privileged in subsequent litigation.8 2

74. In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 236.
75. Id. at 234.
76. 209 F.R.D. 418 (2002).
77. Id. Though this case involved the work-product doctrine, the case is applicable here
because much of the rationale behind waiver of the attorney-client privilege overlaps with
the rational applied to the waiver of the work product doctrine. See, e.g., In re Steinhardt
Partners, 9 F.3d at 235.
78. In re Bank One, 209 F.R.D. at 420-23.
79. Id. at 424.
80. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
82. See Reed Smith, supra note 54.
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3. Selective Waiver

In an attempt to simplify the decision of whether to comply with
a regulatory agency's requests for waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, some jurisdictions 83 have adopted the concept of selective
waiver.84 Selective waivers allow a corporation to comply with the
regulatory investigation and waive the privilege as to that agency, while

preserving the privilege for subsequent litigation as against third
parties. 85 The doctrine of selective waiver was first recognized in the
Eighth Circuit decision in Diversified Industries v. Meredith.86 Federal
appellate courts are currently split on the issue of selective waiver.87

The District of Columbia, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits do
not recognize selective waiver.88 The First, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits have suggested that selective waiver might be available if it is
supported by a confidentiality agreement. 89 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit has left the issue open, but several district courts have
declined to follow Diversified.90
Even though Federal Appellate Courts are split on the existence
of selective waiver, 9 the doctrine presents a compelling solution to the

waiver issue.92

The SEC has long been an advocate of creating a

83. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
84. Jody E. Okrzesik, Selective Waiver: Should the Government be Privy to Privileged
Information Without Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilegeand Work ProductDoctrine?,34
U. MEM. L. REV. 115, 118-19 (2003).
85. Jeremy Bums, Selective Waiver in the Era of Privilege Uncertainty, 5 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 14 (2005), availableat http://blj.ucdavis.edu/article/552.
86. Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (1977).
87. Burns, supra note 85.
88. Id.; Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re
Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623
(4th Cir. 1988); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 2002).
89. Bums, supra note 85. In a confidentiality agreement, a corporation will agree to
produce privileged information to a regulatory agency, in exchange for a written agreement
that the disclosure of the protected materials will be kept from adverse parties "to the extent
possible under the law." In re McKesson, HBOC Inc., 2005 WL 934331, *9 (N.D. CA).
For an example of a confidentiality agreement see, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomey
client/materials/022/022.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
90. See, e.g., Enron Corp v. Borget, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12471, No. 88 CIV. 2828
(DNE) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1990).
91. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
92. Okrzesik, supra note 84 at 119-20.
Okrzesik cites J. Boggs' dissent in
Columbia/HCA, advocating the use of selective waiver because it will lead to increased
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selective waiver, 93 stating that it would "significantly enhance the

Commission's ability to conduct expeditious investigations and obtain
prompt relief."94 Selective waiver, as applied to bank regulators, would
have the same effect of clarifying what rights are being waived when
cooperating

with

regulators, 95

without

adversely

affecting

the

privilege's goal of encouraging full and frank communications between
attorneys and their clients.9 6 However, the circuit court split 97 and the

fact that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of selective
waiver indicate that other recourses to protecting the privilege from
erosion would be better suited for the short term.
IV. FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES AND THE PRIVILEGE
A. Supervision, Examination, and Enforcement Powers of Bank
Regulators

As the Supreme Court noted in 1947, the banking industry has
been "one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public
callings."98 As a result of the "close and continuous relationship
between the regulators and the regulated," 99 a bank regulator typically
has free access to all information in a financial institution's
possession.'00 The level of access to information that the bank
regulator's have is shockingly intrusive compared to traditional requests
for information in civil litigation.' 1 For example, in response to a
request during the course of an OTS investigation that the regulators
information provided to government agencies in investigations and thus "aid the truthseeking process." Id. (quoting In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 291, 307 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
93. Id.
94. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/338150.htm.
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
98. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947).
99. Lawrence G. Baxter, JudicialResponses to the Recent Enforcement Actions of the
FederalBanking Regulators, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. S193, S196 (1991).
100. Susan Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM. LAWYER, May
1992 at 68 ("[U]nder bank board rules [the OTS regulators] had the right to go in and look
at any and all of [the financial institution's] books and records at any time.").
101. Id.
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direct their requests for information to the financial institution's lawyers
rather than the financial institution itself, the director of examinations
wrote:
An examination is not civil litigation discovery....
Unfettered access, including the ability to appear at [a
thrift] without advance notice, is essential to the
fulfillment of [the regulators'] function.102
Because of the expectation of free access and full disclosure by the
financial institutions, the level of cooperation that the regulators enjoy
during the course of an investigation undoubtedly plays a role in the
enforcement decisions ultimately made by the regulators.
In terms of enforcement, the bank regulators have congressional
authority to use a variety of enforcement powers against banks and thrift
institutions, as well as "institution-affiliated" parties. 0 3 There are two
types of enforcement actions in general: informal supervisory actions
and formal enforcement mechanisms.10 4 Informal supervisory actions
will generally include a regulator's report that identifies problems
within the institution, and serves the purpose of putting the bank's
directors on notice that there is a problem so that they can take
corrective measures. 0 5 Formal enforcement orders, on the other hand,
include a wide array of actions, ranging from consent orders to civil
money penalties of up to $1.25 million dollars per day for being in
10 6
violation of an order.
The bank regulator conducting the investigation has the
authority to determine if it is necessary to take formal actions against a
bank and affiliated parties.'0 7 It is through this exercise of discretion
that bank regulators can "reward" the banks and affiliated parties for

102. Id.

103. 12 U.S.C. 1818 (2001). "Institution-affiliated" parties includes directors, officers,
controlling shareholders, agents, consultants, joint venture partners, and under certain
circumstances, independent contractors, including attorneys and accountants. 12 U.S.C.
1813(u); see also LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 609 (2d. ed. 2004).
104. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 103, at 609.
105. Id.
106. Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,249a.1 (Nov. 4, 2004).
107. Broome & Markham, supra note 103, at 609.
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waiving the privilege and fully disclosing all requested information at
the outset of the investigation. 0 8 The bank regulator has the authority
to decide what type of formal enforcement order will be sought and the
degree of severity of any such order.'0 9 For example, a bank could be
required to enter into a formal written agreement with the agency to

stop an unsound practice." 0 While a breach of the formal written
agreement could result in a civil money penalty,"' the only initial
penalty is the agreement itself. On the other hand, the same practice
could result in an automatic assessment of a civil money penalty for
each day the institution is in violation of a law or regulation." 2
B. Cooperationwith Bank Regulators and Waiverfor Third Party
Actions

1. Supervision and Examination
When a bank regulator initiates an investigation into a banking
institution or corporation," 3 the bank regulator will request information
from the institution. Inevitably, some of the requested information
would be non-discoverable in litigation because it falls within the realm
of the attorney-client privilege.' 4 In response to the bank regulators'
request, the institution will likely produce the otherwise privileged

documents for one of several reasons: (1) the agency promises
cooperation credit for disclosure of the protected information;" 5 (2) the
108. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2) (2001).
110. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2001).
111. Id.
112. However, if the regulator chose to seek this penalty, the penalty must be approved
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (2001).
113. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 13.
114. Id. This is especially problematic if the institution has already completed an
internal investigation of the issue itself, either through an internal audit or by hiring an
outside entity. See Buchanan, supra note 41, at 604-05. As a result of the internal
investigation, it is likely that more privileged information exists and it is likely that the
information closely relates to the topic of the investigation. Id. The findings in an internal
investigation will likely be the type of information the bank will want to protect the most
under the privilege. Id.
115. See Dunst & Sims, supra note 57, at 4. The SEC has recently renewed its focus on
investigations in the wake of high profile securities scandals, such as Enron. To facilitate
cooperation with investigations, the SEC has been willing to give companies benefits for
cooperation, even to the extent of "giving a company a complete pass (despite the corporate
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institution wants the investigation to proceed quickly and go away
quietly; or (3) the institution fears monetary and prosecutorial
6
repercussions for not disclosing everything up front. 1
Typically, voluntary disclosure of otherwise privileged
information constitutes a waiver of the privilege for subsequent
litigation.'
However, courts have varied in their decisions whether the
disclosure of otherwise privileged information to regulatory agencies
should also serve to waive the privilege. 18 Whether or not courts
determine that the financial institutions have waived the attorney-client
privilege regarding voluntarily disclosed information in subsequent
third party actions will inevitably impact whether financial institutions
continue the practice of full cooperation with bank regulators, both in
their supervisory role and during the course of examinations and
investigations.
2. Enforcement Actions
Because of the close relationship between the bank regulators
and financial institutions and because of the importance of stability for
banks and other financial institutions to the economy, regulators have
traditionally refrained from using formal enforcement actions, 119 except
in extreme circumstances.1 20 The result of this practice is a striking
difference in the formal methods of enforcement used by regulators
such as the SEC. Banking regulators typically "use methods of
informal supervision, almost always without formal adjudication, even

admission of hundreds of millions of dollars of financial statement irregularities) on the
basis of its 'extensive cooperation with the Commission's investigation."' Id. (quoting SEC
Charges Royal Ahold and Three Former Top Executives With Fraud, SEC Press Release,
Oct. 13, 2004).
116. Id. "[T]he SEC has recently assessed massive civil penalties - Worldcom was fined
over $2 billion - in part for failure to provide complete or correct information in a timely
manner." Id.
117. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 561 (holding that
Diversified made only a limited waiver of information when making a disclosure pursuant
to an SEC investigation). But see In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation Billing
Practices Litigation, 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that when a corporation gives
privileged information to a regulator, the corporation waives the attorney-client privilege,
even when made pursuant to a confidentiality agreement).
119. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
120. Baxter, supra note 99.
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for the determination of controversies.
Because of the traditional openness of the relationship between
financial institutions and their regulators, whether the regulator chooses
a formal or informal enforcement action against a bank may be
important in determining whether the agency is then an "adversary" for
purposes of litigation. 121 When an informal enforcement action is taken,
the argument that the regulator is not in an adversarial position is
stronger because the relationship between the regulator and the financial
institution is still cooperative in nature. Formal enforcement actions,
however, are arguably more comparable to enforcement actions taken
enforcement.1 23
by the SEC, who rarely resort to informal measures of
It is interesting to note that, in regards to SEC actions, courts are likely
to hold that the regulator and corporation are in an adversarial position,
and that the attorney-client privilege has thus been waived with respect
to third party actions.1 24 This could indicate a possible division in
privilege waivers between formal and informal enforcement actions
taken by banking regulators, the former being more likely to be
characterized as "adversarial," and thus more likely to result in privilege
waivers as to third party actions.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EROSION AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. Implications
As regulatory agencies appear to be eroding the attorney-client
privilege through their requests for cooperation iMinvestigations, the
real question involves what effect the erosion of the doctrine will have
on the banking industry. If the attorney-client privilege is eroded to the
extent that institutions disclose all information to regulators
automatically, regulators will have to spend much less time and money
If regulators are more assured that they are
on investigations. 12
receiving full and complete cooperation with their investigations, this

121. Id.

122.
123.
124.
125.

See supra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
Baxter, supra note 99.
See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
See Buchanan, supra note 41, at 605.
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could lead to more predictability in issuing enforcement actions for
wrongdoing. 2' 6
Despite these possible beneficial effects of the erosion of the
privilege, the negative effects will likely outweigh the positive. First,
the erosion of the privilege will likely discourage candor in
communications between financial institutions and their attorneys. 27 In
the 2005 survey conducted by the Association of Corporate Counsel,
ninety-five percent of respondents stated that if the privilege did not
offer protections, they think that "there will be a 'chill' in the flow or
candor of information from their clients. 28 Absent this necessary
candor between attorney and client, counsel will be ill-equipped to give
useful advice and financial institutions' ability to benefit from their
investment in legal services will be impaired. 129
Another likely effect of the erosion of the attorney-client
privilege is that self-reporting and self-investigating by financial
institutions will be deterred. 30 Because regulatory agencies give credit
for complete cooperation with investigations,' 3' there is less incentive
for a financial institution to uncover information that they may be
required to disclose during a government investigation.3 2
If a
questionable practice goes unnoticed by the institution, there is no
potentially privileged information to disclose. As the erosion of the
privilege becomes more well known, each internal investigation will be
done bearing in mind the possibility that the information could become
subject to a regulatory investigation in the future. "3 With this in mind,
counsel may try to limit the amount of internal policing and internal
reporting by employees. 34 In addition to the direct effects that the
erosion of the privilege could have on financial institutions, there is also
the fear that the erosion of the attorney-client privilege with respect to

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 18.
ACC Survey, supra note 59, at 2.
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 18-19.
McPhee & Welsh, supra note 44, at 25.

131. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.

132. McPhee & Welsh, supra note 44, at 24.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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organizational clients could lead to the erosion of the privilege in other

areas. 135
B. Legislative Solutions
Because of the potentially detrimental implications of the
erosion of the attorney-client privilege on financial institutions and
other corporations and the inconsistency of courts, the solution to the
issue may best be left to legislatures. Possible legislative solutions have
been suggested by the ABA and the SEC, and are discussed below.
1. The ABA Report
On May 18, 2005, the ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client
Privilege (ABA Task Force) 3 6 issued a report which identified that "the
attorney-client confidentiality has come under serious pressure [due
to] ... requests by prosecutors and government regulators for the
privilege."1 37
production of material protected by the attorney-client
Although the Task Force's report focused on investigative requests by
the SEC, the report suggests that investigative practices of other federal
138 The bank
agencies may be eroding the privilege in a similar fashion.
regulators serve similar regulatory functions with similar investigation
practices as those employed by the SEC and outlined in the Task
Force's report. Because these bank regulators have similar investigative
functions to that of the SEC, it is likely that any decision on whether
in the context of the SEC
disclosure constitutes waiver of the 1privilege
39
regulators.
bank
to
would also apply
135.

ACC Survey, supra note 59, at 8. For example, if the corporate privilege is eroded,

"it's a short step to eroding individuals' privileges next." Id.
136. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2.
137. Id. at 1-2.
138. Id. at 13 (stating that "[iun recent years, particularly on the federal level, criminal
law enforcement authorities and regulatory authorities have adopted policies and employed
practices and procedures that suggest that if corporations disclose documents and
information that are protected by the corporate attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine, they will receive credit for cooperation").
139. Case law pertaining to SEC examinations has been applied to cases involving the

bank regulators. For example, in In re Bank One Securities Litigation, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois relied on SEC cases including Westinghouse and
Salomon Brothers Treasury Litigation v. Steinhardt Partners,in concluding that Bank One
and the OCC were "adversaries" for purposes of waiving the work-product protection. In re
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Financial institutions are required to share an increasing amount
of information with bank regulators, due to strict reporting requirements
and the increased voracity in investigations.1 40 The disclosure scenario
in regards to the bank regulators differs from that of the SEC scenario
because the bank regulators have different objectives. Whereas the
SEC's primary missiofi is to "protect investors," 141 the bank regulators'
objective is to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial
institutions themselves. 142 Because the bank regulators seek to assure
the safety and soundness of the financial institutions, 143 it is unlikely
that they would take measures that could ruin a financial institution's
business. Further, because the bank regulators seek to ensure the safety
and soundness of the financial institution,' 44 the regulators have a
continued presence on-site at many large banks. 145 For example, the
OCC has twenty-four "large bank resident examiner teams,"' 146 who
work full time on-site at each of the nation's largest national banks.' 47
Because of the continued presence of the regulators, whether or not
disclosure of privileged information waives the privilege is clearly
important for financial institutions, as their daily activities could
potentially disclose information, to on-site regulators, that might be
privileged but for the disclosure.
Bank One, 209 F.R.D. at 423-24.
140. Testimony of Mr. Steve Bartlett on Behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable to
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 21, 2005.
141. Mission Statement of SEC, availableat http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
142. See About the OCC, http://www.occ.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2005);
see also Mission Statement of the OTS,
http://www.ots.treas.gov/mission.cfm?cat
Number=39 (last visited Oct. 13, 2005). In recent years, the bank regulators have shifted
the focus of their examinations, placing emphasis on an institution's internal control systems
and on the way it manages and controls its risks, rather than investigating whether a bank
was operating in a safe and sound manner at a specific point in time. UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, Risk-Focused
Bank Examinations:Regulators of Large Banking OrganizationsFace Challenges, at 2, Jan.
2000.
143. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
145. OCC Strategic Plan, 2003-2008, at 6, http://www.occ.gov/spln2003.pdf (last visited
Oct. 13, 2005).
146. Id.
147. United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requestors, RiskFocusedBank Examinations: Regulators of Large Banking OrganizationsFace Challenges,
at 4, Jan. 2000. In addition to these on-site examiners, the OCC designates the nation's
largest banks, defined as having over $25 billion in assets, between one and three deputy
comptrollers located in their Washington D.C. headquarters. Id. at 16.
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The bank regulators recognize that the production of attorneyclient privileged documents during the course of an examination may
result in a waiver of the privilege. 148 The OCC Rules of Practice and
Procedure expressly state that the agency is not entitled to discover
privileged materials. 149 The bank regulators have recognized this
provision as a limitation on the open exchange of information needed to
carry out successful examinations and have attempted to mitigate the
effects of the potential waiver. 5 ° For example, the OCC states that
"[we are] of the view that a bank that discloses privileged information
to an examiner during an examination does not waive its privileges" and
encourages its examiners to take steps to safeguard a bank's privileged
materials during the investigation. 5 ' Similarly, the FRB's investigation
policy is to protect materials obtained during the course of an
investigation or examination from disclosure to third parties "to the
greatest extent possible consistent with applicable law and the public
interest."'1 2 Despite these declarations by the bank regulators, it is not
clear, if the bank regulators' position on whether disclosure to their
agents constitutes a waiver is determinative of whether the privilege
will actually be deemed waived by a court.
The ABA Task Force Report suggests the adoption of federal
legislation that would permit institutions to provide privileged
information to regulators in connection with an investigation without
53 Such legislation would
waiving the privilege as to third parties.'
provide regulators with ability to protect certain information from losing
its privileged status in subsequent litigation and could prove to be a
useful tool in balancing the need to preserve the privilege with the need
54
for timely and complete disclosure in regulatory investigations.'
HANDBOOK:
148. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S
LITIGATION AND OTHER LEGAL MATTERS, at 7-8 (Feb. 2000).

"Privileged documents are not discoverable.
149. 12 C.F.R. § 19.24(c) (2005).
Privileges include the attorney-client privilege, work-product privilege, any government's or
government agency's deliberative process privilege, and any other privileges the
Constitution, any applicable act of Congress, or the principles of common law provide." Id.
150. Reed Smith, supra note 54.
151. See OCC COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 148, at 8.
152. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System Memo, Access to Books and
Records of Financial Institutions During Examinations and Inspections, SR 97-17 (SUP),
June 6, 1997.

153. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 2, at 25.
154. Id.
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The SEC has made recommendations similar to the ABA's
proposed legislation. In an SEC report made pursuant to the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002,'

the SEC recommended enactment of legislation

"to allow companies to produce internal reports and other documents
pertaining to investigations without waiving any privileges."' 5 6

The

SEC's recommendation for legislation may indicate recognition that
regulators do not have the authority to determine whether disclosure of
privileged information will cause privileges to be waived. That courts
have held disclosure to the OCC renders the privilege waived in
subsequent litigation further indicates that regulators do not have the
authority to preserve the privilege.' 57

2. Proposed Changes to Federal Sentencing Guidelines
On November 1, 2004, amendments to the federal sentencing

guidelines that relate to corporations and financial institutions went into
effect."'58 Of particular importance in these new guidelines was a change
in the commentary to section 8C2.5 of the guidelines, which suggested
that waiver of the attorney-client privilege is a necessary element of full

cooperation in some investigations.15 9 Prior to the 2004 amendments,
the Sentencing Guidelines commentary was silent on the issue of
privilege waiver. 160 Robert Evans, Director of the ABA Governmental
Affairs Division, stated that the amended commentary

155. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2005).
156. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 704 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002.

157. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
158. Bruce A. Green & David C. Clifton, Feeling A Chill, Changing Government
Policies are Pressing Corporationsand Attorneys to Disclose Protected Information, ABA
JOURNAL 61, 63 (Dec. 2005).
159. Notice of Submission to Congress of Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines,
69 Fed. Reg. 28994 (May 19, 2004). The commentary states that "waiver of attorney-client
privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability
score [for cooperation with the government]... unless such waiver is necessary in order to
provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the
organization." However, the ABA believes that this "exception is likely to swallow the
rule" and that organizations will be forced to grant routine requests for waivers. Letter of
Robert D. Evans, Director of ABA Governmental Affairs to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Aug. 15, 2005 at 3.
160. Evans, supra note 159.
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authorizes and encourages the government to require
entities to waive their attorney-client ...protections in

order to show 'thorough' cooperation with the
government and thereby qualify for a reduction in the
lenient sentence - under
culpability score - and a more
61

the sentencing guidelines.1

The ABA has taken the position that the amended commentary has led

to forced privilege waivers. Because of this, the ABA proposed an
amendment to section 8C2.5, which would "clarify that the waiver of
the attorney-client privilege... should not be a factor in determining
whether a sentencing reduction under the guidelines is warranted for
' 162 The sentencing commission has
cooperation with the government.'
included the privilege waiver amendment on its list of issues to be
163
considered in the 2005-2006 amendment cycle, but the effect, if any,
that the ABA recommendations will have is not clear. However, the
proposed ABA amendment has garnered the support of numerous other
groups, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Attorneys. 164

161. Id.
162. Id. The proposed change in the commentary would read as follows:
To qualify for a reduction under subsection (g)(1) or (g)(2), cooperation
must be both timely and thorough. To be timely, the cooperation must
begin essentially at the same time as the organization is officially
notified of a criminal investigation. To be thorough, the cooperation
should include the disclosure of all pertinent non-privileged information
known by the organization. A prime test of whether the organization has
disclosed all pertinent non-privileged information is whether the
information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify the
nature and extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the
criminal conduct.... Waiver of attorney-client privilege and of work
product protections is not a factor in determining whether a reduction in
culpability score under subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (g) is
warranted.
Id.
163. Green & Clifton, supra note 158.
164. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The attorney-client privilege is being eroded in the context of
federal financial regulators through their requests for cooperation in
investigation. In general, the privilege is only waived when the
information is voluntarily disclosed to adversaries. 165 Though the
regulatory agency is arguably not an "adversary" and the disclosure of
information may not be "voluntary," the trend is for courts to deem the
privilege waived as to subsequent litigation and third parties. 66 As
privilege waivers have become increasingly prevalent, the attorneyclient privilege has become eroded in the regulatory context. 67 The
idea of selective waiver of information disclosed during the course of
regulatory investigations is a compelling deterrent to the erosion of the
privilege, but circuit courts are divided on whether selective waiver is
allowed. 6 Therefore, as the ABA and the SEC have suggested, the
best solution to the erosion of the privilege may be found in legislative
action. 169 Though it is not clear what overall affect this will have on the
banking industry, it is clear that the erosion of the privilege could
dramatically impact the cooperative relationship financial institutions
currently enjoy with the bank regulators.
PRISCILLA L. WALTON

165. See supra notes 51-82 and accompanying text.
166. Id.

167. See supra notes 27-82 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 136-157 and accompanying text.

